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This paper aims to assess the performance of Village Credit
Institutions (Lembaga Perkreditan Desa or LPD) in Gianyar district,
Bali province, Indonesia and its affecting factors –particularly its
institutional environment. The performance indicators assessed
include financial indicators (such as portfolio quality, leverage,
capital adequacy ratio, productivity, efficiency, profitability, and
financial viability) and outreach of the LPDs. Institutions here refer
to the rules or procedures that shape how agents (people) interact and
the organizations that implement the rules and codes of conduct to
achieve desired outcomes. Based on data from financial reports of
174 LPDs of Gianyar district in 1999 and 2001, interviews with some
stakeholders (clients, chairmen, and member of commissioner board)
of the LPDs, and using descriptive analysis approach, this paper
reveals that the LPDs have achieved a good performance indicators
and been sustainable, and the good performance and sustainability
have been very much influenced by institutional environment which
includes both formal and informal institutions.
* This Article is based on a section of Ph.D. thesis of the author at Flinders University, Adelaide,
Australia, 2005. Many thanks go to two anonymous referees that have made extremely helpful
comments. I have also profited from comments by Susanne Schech and Joe William from
Development Studies and Department of Business Economics, Flinders University, Adelaide,
Australia, respectively.
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Introduction
Microfinance1 institutions have
evolved as an economic development
tool intended to benefit low-income
people since late 1990s. Ledgerwood
(1999: 34) points out that the goals of
microfinance institutions as develop-
ment organizations is to service the
financial needs of unserved or under-
served markets as a means of meeting
development objectives such as to cre-
ate employment, reduce poverty, help
existing business grow or diversify
their activities, empower women or
other disadvantaged population groups
(poor people or low-income people),
and encourage the development of new
business. In short, microfinance insti-
tutions have been expected to reduce
poverty, which is considered as the
most important development objec-
tive (World Bank 2000). However, the
positive impacts of microfinance in-
stitutions on the socioeconomic wel-
fare of the poor can only be attained
and sustained if the institutions can
achieve a good financial and outreach
performance.
The aim of this paper is to assess
the performance of the Village Credit
Institutions (LPDs) of Gianyar district
in Bali and the influence of institutions
on the performance. The performance
analysis focuses on financial indica-
tors and outreach. The financial indi-
cators include portfolio quality, lever-
age, capital adequacy ratio, productiv-
ity, efficiency, profitability, and finan-
cial viability. The outreach indicators
cover clients and staff outreach, loan
outreach and saving/deposits outreach.
Institutions here are defined as the
rules or procedures that shape how
agents (people) interact and the orga-
nizations that implement the rules and
codes of conduct to achieve desired
outcomes (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith
1992: 371; North 1991: 97; North 1990:
3, World Bank 2002: 6). Institutions
are classified in two types which are
formal and informal institutions (North
1991: 97; World Bank 2002: 6). For-
mal institutions include the rules writ-
ten into the law and regulations by
government, rules codified and adopt-
ed by private institutions, and public
and private organizations operating
under public law. Informal institutions,
which often are operating outside the
formal legal system, reflect unwritten
codes of social conduct such as social
norms and sanctions and using social
mechanisms to creditworthiness based
on the reputation of the agents in-
volved.
The approach of this study is a
case study analysis. The selection of
LPDs of Gianyar as a case for this
study is based on some rationales.
Scapens (1990: 272-273) suggests
three rationales in selecting a case.
1 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) defines microfinance as the provision of a broad range
of financial services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to
poor and low-income households and their micro-enterprises (ADB 2000. Finance for the Poor:
Microfinance Development Strategy. Manila: Asian Development Bank).
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First, the case selected can represent a
critical case that directly exhibits and
addresses key issues that have been
well identified and discussed in the
subject area under study. This critical
case can be used to determine whether
a theory’s propositions are correct or
whether some alternative set of expla-
nations need to be developed and might
be more relevant. Second, the case can
represent an extreme case or a unique
case that extends the subject area be-
yond the limits of its previous observa-
tion in circumstances that differ from
scenarios previously considered. Third,
the exploratory case2 may be selected
for the examination of a subject area
on which there is little prior theory or
evidence available. Yin (2003: 42) adds
two more rationales, that is, the revela-
tory case and the longitudinal case.
The revelatory case exists when an
investigator has an opportunity to ob-
serve and analyze a phenomenon pre-
viously inaccessible to scientific in-
vestigation and the longitudinal case
refers to a study of the same case at two
or more different points in time.
From those perspectives, the se-
lection of LPD as a case is an ex-
ploratory one. It is ‘exploratory’ be-
cause even though the LPD is consid-
ered as a success microfinance institu-
tion in Indonesia by some scholars
(Chaves and Gonzales-Vega 1996;
Christen et al. 1995), the LPD –in
particular the LPDs of Gianyar– repre-
sents a microfinance institution that is
little understood from the point of view
of its sociocultural context, its man-
agement, and other factors influencing
its performance and sustainability. In
addition, the selection of Gianyar dis-
trict was also influenced by the ease of
access of the researcher to the sample
region.
The dataset used as the basis for
calculation and analysis of the indica-
tors are mainly based on financial re-
ports of 174 LPDs of the Gianyar dis-
trict in 1999 and 2001. The data from
income statements includes operating
income, operational cost (expenses),
labor cost (salary), net income (profit),
and provision for loan losses. From
balance statements, it is possible to
ascertain the total assets, current as-
sets (loan outstanding and credit de-
fault), fixed assets, client savings, cli-
ent time deposits, capital, and equity.
In addition, other related data such as
the number of client data (including
borrowers, savers, and depositors), the
data on population and Gross Regional
Domestic Product (GRDP) of Gianyar
district and its subdistricts from the
Central Board of Statistics of Gianyar
district are also used in this analysis.
Even though a case study analysis
does not seek to mimic the generaliz-
able findings from a questionnaire sur-
vey of a large sample of respondents
from a population, it nonetheless of-
fers the prospect of theoretical rather
than statistical generalizations. When
case studies are properly undertaken,
2 Yin uses the terms ‘representative’ or ‘typical’ case (see Yin 2003: 42)
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they should not only fit the specific
individual, group, or event studied,
but also offer insights that can be trans-
ferred to similar individuals, groups,
and events (Berg 1998: 218). The case
that provides convincing observations
and explanations will be retained as a
key source of insight into concepts,
their relationship and an explanatory
of cause and effect at the micro level.
It offers the policy makers an under-
standing of individual differences and
unique, particular processes at the in-
dividual enterprise level –something
that is inaccessible to the decision
maker who relies solely upon the nec-
essarily general findings of statisti-
cally survey results that can only pro-
vide predictions of majority attitudes
or behavior at macro-superficial level
of research questions to which any
survey is limited. Thus a case study of
the type offered here provides an ex-
pansion of our understandings that can
be obtained from empirical observa-
tions by offering rich detail in an ac-
tual enterprise context (Scapens 1990).
The advantage of this case study
research strategy lies in its revealing
the microfinance institution as a unique
fusion of social, cultural, and economic
processes. “Scientifically” derived
general laws and statistical generali-
zations from a large-scale survey may
or may not apply to the case of a
particular organization and may not
explain its peculiar circumstances. Un-
derstanding and explanation on an
enterprise’s success or failure and iden-
tification of its available strategic al-
ternatives must ultimately come from
addressing the unique holistic charac-
teristics of that particular case (Scapens
1990). The application of case study
analysis to microfinance institutions
offers the prospect of capturing situ-
ational data and perspective that may
prove crucial to the likely effective-
ness of any policies or strategies for-
mulated for the institutions. It is ar-
gued that this type of analysis provides
a safeguard against the tendency to ask
the wrong questions, to ignore impor-
tant variables and relationships, or to
simplistically model a complex entity
and its processes (Fuller and Parker
2002). Instead, in the microfinance
institution context, field research can
offer the possibility of better recogniz-
ing the distinctive qualities, inherent
limitations and potential strategic ad-
vantages of a microfinance institution.
Performance Measurement
of Microfinance Institution
Microfinance institution is a fi-
nancial intermediary. As a financial
intermediary aiming to give a better
access for credit to low-income people,
the institution is expected to be finan-
cially viable in achieving its self-
sustainability. Consequently, the per-
formance measurement in part has to
be based on its financial viability.3 The
cost efficiency should be the primary
3 Financial viability refers to the ability of a microfinance institution to cover its costs with earned
revenue
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Figure 1. Assessing the Performance of Microfinance Institutions
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Self-sustainability Outreach to target clients
Subsidy Dependence Index
Measures subsidiaries received
against interest earned
Outreach index
Evaluates outreach to clients and
quality of services offered
Examples of subsidies:
 Interest rate subsidy on
concessionally borrowed funds
 Opportunity cost of equity
 Reserve requirement exemptions
 Free equipment provided by
government/donors
 Government's assumption of loan
losses
 Free training for staff provided by
government/donor
 Government assumption of
foreign-exchange loans
Examples of indicators:
Market penetration
 Number of annual growth rate
saving and loan accounts
 Value and annual growth rate of
the loan portfolio and deposits
 Number of branches and staff
Relative income level
 Value of average loan and range
of loan amounts
 Percentage of rural clients
 Percentage of female clients
Quality of services
 Transaction costs to clients
 Flexibility and suitability of
services
 Distribution network
Source: Yaron et al. (1997)
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concern in order to achieve its self-
sustainability of the institution
(Khandker 1998). However, in the lit-
erature, performance measurement of
microfinance institution is based not
only on self-sustainability but also on
the outreach of the institutions, mea-
sured by the coverage of target house-
holds and the extent of services they
receive. Outreach indicators are con-
sidered as proxies for impacts of
microfinance institutions on develop-
ment (Yaron et al. 1997). The twin
criteria of self-sustainability and out-
reach –which are complementary–
have been then the yardstick of
microfinance performance evaluation
(Chaves and Gonzales-Vega 1996;
Christen et al. 1995; Ledgerwood 1999;
Yaron 1992; Yaron 1994; Yaron et al.
1998).
The assessment framework of
Yaron can be seen in Figure 1 (Yaron
et al. 1997: 90). The first criterion is
self-sustainability, which can be
achieved when the return on equity,
net of any subsidy received, equals or
exceeds the opportunity cost of the
equity funds. Subsidy dependence is
the inverse of self-sustainability (Yaron
1992). Traditionally, microfinance in-
stitutions have been sustained by vari-
ous types of implicit or explicit subsi-
dies to continue operations.
The most common subsidies have
been differences between the market
interest rate and interest rates paid on
concessional borrowing from the state
or donor, state assumption of foreign
exchange losses on loans denominated
in foreign currencies, obligatory de-
posits by other financial or public in-
stitutions at below-market rate, direct
reimbursement by the state or donor of
some or all operating costs, and ex-
emption from reserve requirements or
forced investment (Yaron 1994). In
the self-sustainability approach dona-
tions (subsidies) cover start-up costs
and fund experiments meant to find
innovations that reduce the cost of
supply so much that revenue from cli-
ents can cover costs in the long run
(Schreiner 2002). This is the case of
the Village Credit Institutions (LPD)
of Bali which only receive a starting
capital of Rp10 million from Provin-
cial Government of Bali for each insti-
tution according to provincial regula-
tion (Government of Bali 2002).4 Since
the LPD does not receive interest rates
subsidy, it is not necessary to calculate
the subsidy dependence index (SDI).
As stated by Yaron (1994: 57), the SDI
measures the percentage increase in
the average on-lending interest rate
required to compensate for eliminat-
ing subsidies, including the subsidy a
microfinance institution receives
through paying interest below the mar-
ket rate on its borrowed funds (mostly
rediscounting facilities with the cen-
tral bank or soft loans from donors).
However, other indicators of self-
4 The LPDs of Bali rely on savings and deposits rather than on credit and grants as their source
of refinancing (BI and GTZ 2000).
397
Arsyad—An Assessment of Microfinance Institution Performance
Table 1. Microfinance Assessment Performance Approaches
ACCION WOCCU PLANET MICRORATE
CAMEL PEARLS RATING GIRAFE
Purpose of Internal tool for Ongoing performance Measurement and 1. Evaluate micro
evaluation management, board, monitoring by control of risk. -finance institution
and network. management,and credit risk for
external supervisors. potential investors
and creditors,
2. Influence micro-
finance institutions
performance,
3. Compare micro-
finance perfor-
mance.
Main clients ACCION affiliates. Affiliated credit unions, Donors (AFD, Donors (50%),
More recently, bank leagues, and credit BNDES), investors microfinance institutions
supervisors and union regulators. (Blue Orchard, (30%), and investors
secondtier Financial Bank), (20%).
institutions. creditors, NGOs
(CARE, VITA) and
microfinance
institutions.
Key feature Roadmap to Pinpoints key financial Detailed rating Creditworthiness
of methodology microfinance seeking strengths and opinion but unclear (Recommend/Watch/
to become formal weaknesses. definition of risk Caution) and rationale;
financial intermediaries. level. benchmarking and peer
group comparison.
Approach bias Strong on management, Strictly financial. Strong on manage- Strong on financial track
profitability, and Includes comprehensive ment governance, and record and bench-
benchmarking financial analysis. best practices. marking against peers.
practices.
Qualitative vs. More qualitative (53%) All quantitative More qualitative More quantitative
quantitative than quantitative (47%). (57%) than than qualitative
Original CAMEL was quantitative (43%).
70% quantitative More weight to
fiduciary risk
Limitations No qualitative Reliance on external Relatively little
evaluation  consultants  judgemental input
Source: CGAP (2001)
398
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, September-December 2005, Vol. 7, No. 3
sustainability such as operational self-
sufficiency and financial self-suffi-
ciency are calculated in this study.
The second criterion is the num-
ber of clients served and the variety of
financial services provided. This is an
outreach objective, which consists of
scale and depth of outreach.5 Scale of
outreach refers to the number of cli-
ents served with different types of in-
strument and the depth of outreach
refers to the type of clients reached and
their level of poverty.
Based on these two important cri-
teria –the self-sustainability and the
outreach– several performance assess-
ing techniques have been developed in
1990s (CGAP 2001). The key features
of some important approaches are pre-
sented in Table 1. First, ACCION6
Approach which adopts the original
CAMEL methodology to evaluate U.S.
commercial lending institutions
(CGAP 2001). CAMEL is the acro-
nym of Capital adequacy, Asset qual-
ity, Management, Earnings, and Li-
quidity. While the ACCION CAMEL
issues a composite score, similar to a
rating, it is not meant to measure credit
risk. The final score ranges from 0 to 5,
or D to AAA. A microfinance institu-
tion scoring below 2 should be operat-
ing a lending business. Scores from 2
to 3 indicate microfinance institution
with fundamental weaknesses that must
be corrected. The purpose of this tool
is to strengthen management and gen-
erate a common framework for evalu-
ating and comparing the performance
ACCION affiliates across countries
such as in Latin American countries.
Second, the World Council of
Credit Unions (WOCCU) –a nonprofit
organization that promotes the devel-
opment of financial cooperatives, head-
quartered in Madison, Wisconsin– uses
PEARLS in assessing the performance
of microfinance institution (CGAP
2001). The PEARLS is a set of 45
ratios used to evaluate and monitor the
financial stability of credit unions
within WOCCU, especially for use in
its institutional strengthening pro-
grams. PEARLS are grouped under
six areas of financial performance: pro-
tection, effective financial structure,
asset quality, rates of return and costs,
liquidity, and signs of growth
(PEARLS).
The PEARLS methodology is
driven by financial performance. How-
ever, PEARLS does not explicitly ad-
dress management, though an insti-
tution’s financial performance obvi-
ously says a great deal about its man-
agement.
5 Outreach is measured by hybrid index comprising several indicators, such as the number of
clients, the amount of savings and the average value of savings accounts, the average of loans size
(as a proxy for income level of the clientele, the number of branches and village post/units, the
variety of financial services offered, the percentage of target population served, the annual growth
of microfinance institutions assets over recent years in real terms, and women’s participation (where
social norms discriminate against women).
6 ACCION International is an organization aims to reduce poverty in North and South America
by providing small loans. It was founded in 1961 and based in Boston, Massachusetts.
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Table 2.The Performance Indicators of Microfinance Institutions
(Ledgerwood’s Approach)
Areas Indicators
Portfolio quality  Repayment rates
 Portfolio quality ratios (arrears rate, portfolio at risk,
ratio of delinquent borrowers)
 Loan loss ratios
Productivity and efficiency  Productivity ratios (number of active loans per credit
officer, average portfolio outstanding per credit of-
ficer, amount disbursed per period per credit officer)
 Efficiency ratios (operating cost ratio, cost per unit of
currency lent, cost per loan made)
Financial viability  Financial spread
 Operational self-sufficiency
 Financial self-sufficiency
 Subsidy Dependence Index
Profitability  Return on Assets Ratio
 Return on Business Ratio
 Return on Equity Ratio
Leverage & capital adequacy  Leverage (debt to equity ratio)
 Capital adequacy standards
Scale, outreach, and growth  Clients and staff (number of clients, number of staff,
number of branches, percentage of total target clien-
tele serviced, etc.)
 Loan outreach (number of currently active borrowers,
total balance outstanding loans, average outstanding
portfolio, average disbursed loans size, average dis-
bursed loans size as a percentage of GDP per capita,
value of loans per staff member, number of loans per
staff member, average outstanding loan size, average
outstanding loan size as a percentage of GDP per
capita, etc.)
 Savings outreach (total balance of voluntary savings
accounts, total annual average savings as a percentage
of annual average outstanding loan portfolio, number
of current voluntary savings clients, value of average
savings account, number of savers per staff member,
average savings deposits as a percentage of GDP per
capita, etc.)
Source: Ledgerwood (1999), tabulated by author
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Third, PlaNet Rating –a branch of
PlaNet Finance, an international non-
profit organization based in Paris– uses
GIRAFE Rating in assessing the per-
formance of microfinance institutions
(CGAP 2001). GIRAFE’s 26 indica-
tors are grouped under six areas of
risk: governance and decision making
process, information and management
tools, risk analysis and control, assets
including loan portfolio, funding (eq-
uity and liabilities), and efficiency and
profitability. Among other approaches,
GIRAFE gives the most weight to “fi-
duciary” risk-how institution is gov-
erned, and whether it may fail to meet
investors’ and shareholders’ expecta-
tions because of inadequacies in sys-
tems, processes, and organization. The
methodology focuses more on man-
agement than on risk. Fourth, the ap-
proach proposed by MicroRate (CGAP
2001), a limited liability company
based in Washington D.C. MicroRate’s
methodology focuses on how the vari-
ous risks of microfinance institution
operations affect an institution’s cred-
itworthiness. The main components of
this methodology are (1) identifying
key risk areas and their drivers; (2)
comparing the microfinance institu-
tions performance with that of its peers
on an adjusted basis; and (3) making
this information available to the mar-
ket where possible. The key factors
driving the evaluation are efficiency,
asset quality, growth, and profitabil-
ity. MicroRate has completed about
70 assessments so far, most of them in
Latin America.
All of the four techniques pre-
sented above are applicable to assess
the performance of microfinance in-
stitution. However, in selecting an as-
sessment technique, some contextual
factors must be considered, such as
geographical context (appropriate
benchmark in Latin America are not
necessarily adequate for Asia and Af-
rica), the maturity of the institutions
(younger institutions may be incurring
expansion costs without commensu-
rate revenue and should not be com-
pared to mature institutions), and the
varying lending approaches that are
used (Ledgerwood 1999). Performance
indicators must be put in the context of
where and how the different micro-
finance institutions are operating.
Moreover, Ledgerwood argues that ma-
jority of the present assessment tech-
niques are based on the assumption
that most microfinance institutions are
primarily lending institutions. Hence,
she proposes an assessment technique
in her book Microfinance Handbook
published by the World Bank (1999)
as presented in Table 2.
Ledgerwood (1999) points out that
this technique has been drawn from a
number of microfinance institutions,
both formal and semi formal, around
the world. She points out that each of
these performance indicators was cho-
sen because they are useful in manag-
ing microfinance institutions (internal
management) such as productivity and
efficiency. Many of them (including
financial viability, profitability, lever-
age and capital adequacy ratios, and
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scale, outreach, and growth) are also
useful for external parties, such as
investors or donors (Ledgerwood 1999:
205).
Considering the nature of the
LPDs of Bali which were designed as
financial intermediaries from the be-
ginning and the ability of the LPDs to
rely on savings and deposits rather
than on credit and grants as their source
of refinancing (Bank Indonesia and
GTZ 2000), the availability of data,
appropriateness in geographical con-
text, and the end users of the assess-
ment, Ledgerwood’s approach seems
to be the most appropriate one to be
used in this study. The calculation
technique of the indicators chosen in
this study is provided in Appendix 1.
Sociocultural Characteristics
of Balinese
The discussion on the sociocul-
tural characteristics of Balinese is fo-
cused on the role of custom village
(desa adat) and banjar as corporate
groups (social system) on the social
daily life of Balinese. This discussion
is very useful in assessing the factors
affecting performance of the Village
Credit Institutions of Bali since some
of these sociocultural factors, it is ar-
gued, have played a major role in the
success of government programs such
as family planning, small-scale indus-
try training, and loan programs in Bali
(Jayasuriya and Nehen 1989: 13; War-
ren 1991: 233) .
In Bali, besides administrative
village (desa dinas), which is an ele-
ment of government administration,
there are also custom villages (desa
adat). The administrative village in
Bali and all over Indonesia was estab-
lished by the Government of Republic
of Indonesia through the Village Gov-
ernment Law No. 5/1979. This Law
sets out to create uniform local admin-
istrative structure across Indonesia,
with the stated objective of increasing
the effectiveness of village adminis-
tration and public participation in de-
velopment policy (Warren 1991: 238).
However, custom village in Bali con-
tinued to exist as customary institu-
tions and to function alongside their
newly created administrative counter-
parts. However, the custom village is
merely an association of people rather
than a geographical or administrative
unit. Warren (1993: 20) describes the
custom village as “a corporate com-
munity sharing collective descent from
the original village founders, who are
worshipped as deified ancestors in the
classic three village temples the so
called the Kahyangan Tiga (The Three
Holy Temples).”
There have been two fundamental
differences between custom village and
administrative village. The adminis-
trative village boundaries are deter-
mined along administrative lines and
seldom coincide with those of the cus-
tom village. The custom village leader,
the so-called Bandesa Adat, is elected
and custom (adat) matters are decided
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by the community (banjar) members
in a democratic way in custom village
meeting (paruman desa). In contrast,
dinas (administrative) leaders, the so-
called Perbekel or Kepala Desa, are
appointed by, and responsible to, higher
government levels such as subdistrict
and district government level. Accord-
ing to Nordholt, in the Soeharto era
villages maintained the right to choose
their Perbekel or Kepala Desa in Bali,
but in practice there were several re-
strictions (Nordholt 1991). Candidates
were screened and sometimes there
was pressure from above to eliminate
candidates considered to be too inde-
pendent or anti Golkar (state party).
The status of the custom village as
a societal unit based on customary law
was reinforced by the Bali Provincial
Regulation of 1986 on the Status, Func-
tion, and Role of Custom Village in
Bali (Government of Bali 1986). The
custom village, as stated in article 5 of
the Regulation, is a unit of societal
customary law that is social and reli-
gious in nature. The village is the for-
mal repository and guardian of cus-
tomary law and ritual. Meanwhile, the
function and role of custom village, as
stated in article 6 of the Law, is to
support the implementation of devel-
opment program planned by govern-
ment, especially in the religious, cul-
tural, and social area; and to maintain
and utilize the wealth of the custom
village for the welfare of the people
within the village. The ratification of
the Provincial Regulation of 1986 re-
flects the Provincial Government’s
concern with reinforcing the role of
community institutions, grounded in
customary law and practice. The con-
sideration of the regulation states that
recognition of custom village because
custom village has grown and devel-
oped for centuries and contributed sig-
nificantly to the liveability of people
in Bali.
The custom villages are usually
subdivided into several banjar (ham-
lets) for densely populated regions
(Warren 1993). However, Warren
(1993) points out that in a large num-
ber of communities, especially those
found in the mountain areas, banjar
and custom village represent two asso-
ciations covering a single bounded
population. The banjar is the most
basic association of people in custom
villages (community) through which
religious rites, mutual aid, cultural
groups, local development projects and
savings and credit activities are orga-
nized within close social ties. The
members of banjar comprise adult men
who can prove the completeness of
their identity through a female partner
–usually the wife, but sometimes sis-
ter, mother, or daughter. The focus of
religious, social, and economic life of
Balinese is the banjar, which effec-
tively7 implements local custom (adat)
in the name of the custom village, and
organizes community life in Bali
(Geertz and Geertz 1975; Hobart et al.
7 The banjar is effective since its decisions involved the equal participation of all families and
because it operates through consensus rather than confrontation (Mabbet 1985: 39).
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1996; Mabbet 1985). The Village
Credit Institutions (LPDs) of Bali are
rooted to the community and its estab-
lishment is grounded in the customary
law and practice of its people (Arsyad
2005). The institutions are community
financial institutions owned, managed,
and used by the members of the cus-
tom village. The staff and clients of the
LPDs, therefore, have to follow the
customary rules (awig-awig) of cus-
tom village.
There have been two important
duties of the banjar (Hobart et al. 1996:
86-88; Mabbet 1985: 38-40). First,
among the most important duties of
the banjar is the maintenance and res-
titution of the ritual purity of the cus-
tom village. Each banjar has specific
tasks and ritual duties to fulfil for the
benefit of the village temples. This
indicates that the village as a religious-
magical authority is ranked above the
secular autonomy of the banjar. How-
ever, banjar activities can be very
mundane, for example, improving
roads through community work or re-
storing the meetinghouse (bale banjar).
The banjar is generally responsible for
public institutions and even more for
public welfare, which requires not only
material support but also assistance in
ritual matters.
Another important task of the
banjar relates to social control and
surveillance of the actions and behav-
ior of the members in relation to the
custom (Hobart et al. 1996). The banjar
is legally permitted to impose sanc-
tions against members who do not
follow the rules (awig-awig), and fines
may be incurred. For serious offences
against the rules are punished by the
exclusion of the wrongdoer from the
banjar. This means that he/she loses
his/her share of banjar ownership and
the plot of land on which his/her fam-
ily compound is built is withdrawn.
He/she also loses the right, in accor-
dance to the custom, to a funeral in the
village cemetery and subsequent cre-
mation. He/she becomes an outsider
without security of the banjar commu-
nity and must look for a new life far
away from his native village. In rela-
tion to the LPDs, which are owned by
the custom village, this kind of social
sanctions could be applied to the staff
or clients who violate the rules of the
financial institution, such as corrup-
tion or failure to repay their credits
properly (Oka 1999). In other words,
the customary rules (awig-awig) can
be expected to have a positive effect
on the performance of the LPDs.
The Structure and Growth of
Gianyar District’s Economy
At present, Gianyar district with a
population of 395,000 is one of the
growth engines of Bali’s provincial
economy. According to Statistics of
Bali Province 2001, with Gross Re-
gional Domestic Product (GRDP) of
Rp 2,307 billion, Gianyar was the
fourth biggest contributor (12.16%) to
Bali province after Badung district
(20.86%), city of Denpasar (19.19%),
and Buleleng district (12.19%). Based
on GRDP per capita, Gianyar was
ranked third after Badung district and
404
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, September-December 2005, Vol. 7, No. 3
city of Denpasar in the same period.
During Indonesian economic crisis
from 1997 until 1999, the Gianyar
economy still experienced a positive
economic growth. Gianyar economic
growth rates were 6 and 4.5 percent
per annum in 1997 and 2001 respec-
tively. Its economic growth rate in
2001 was higher than Bali and national
average growth rate of 3.4 and 3.3
percent per annum respectively.
The steady economic growth of
Gianyar district over the period be-
tween 1997 and 2001 was partly due to
the Gianyar economy relying highly
on small-scale industries (handicraft
industries) and tourism-related sectors
that were not influenced by the condi-
tion of the domestic economy.8 The
small-scale industries that did not rely
on raw material or heavy capital im-
ports (which is the case of Gianyar’s
small-scale industries) even largely
benefited from the economic crisis due
to rupiah depreciation (Rice et al.
2002).
The important role of small-scale
industries in Gianyar economy was
indicated by the share of manufactur-
ing9 in the GRDP of Gianyar (see Table
3). The textile, leather products and
footwear, and wood products and other
wood products sub-sectors are the pre-
dominant industries in Gianyar dis-
Table 3. Selected Economic Indicators of Gianyar District of Bali Province
1997 and 2001
Sources: Gianyar in Figures 2000 (CBS of Gianyar District 2000); Socio-economic
Profile of Gianyar Population 2001 (CBS of Gianyar District 2002); Regional
Economic-Financial Statistics of Bali 2001 (Bank Indonesia 2002)
Indicators
 Gross Regional Domestic Product at current price (bil-
lion Rp)
 GRDP per capita (million Rp) at current price
 Rate of economic growth at constant price 1993 (%)
 Share of manufacturing sector in GRDP (%)
 Share of agricultural sector in GRDP (%)
 Share of trade, restaurants and hotels in GRDP (%)
 Inflation rate (%)
1997 2001
1,171 2,307
3 5.8
6 4.5
19 20
17 16
29 29
10.3 11.5
8 Data from Central Board of Statistics (CBS) of Bali Province reveals that the number of foreign
tourist arriving in Bali increases from 1,187,153 in 1998 to 1,355,799 in 1999 (CBS of Bali, Bali
in Figures 1999).
9 According to the classification of the Central Board of Statistics of Indonesia (CBS 2001),
manufacturing sector consists of oil and gas manufacturing and non-oil and gas manufacturing.
Non-oil and gas manufacturing consists of several sub-sectors such as textile, leather products and
footwear, and wood products and other wood products.
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trict. The district had only 74 large and
medium sized industrial establish-
ments, but boasted 25,100 small-scale
industrial establishments which em-
ployed 70,914 workers accounted for
88 percent of total employment in
manufacturing sector [Central Board
of Statistic (CBS) of Gianyar 2000].
These small-scale industries are con-
centrated in four centres in Gianyar
which are Sukawati, Ubud, Tegal-
lalang, and Gianyar subdistricts. Dur-
ing the economic crisis, those small-
scale industries were still able to pro-
duce and export their products, and in
turn contribute to the economic growth
of Gianyar.
The economic structure of Gianyar
district is similar to the structure of
provincial economy. This similarity
supports Gianyar district as the case of
this study. Then it is expected that the
findings of this study will also be able
to describe the nature of the LPD in
Bali province. Gianyar’s economy is
dominated by three main sectors –
manufacturing, agriculture, and trade,
restaurants and hotels sector– which
contribute about 65 percent to GRDP
of Gianyar (see Table 3). The remain-
ing 35 percent were contributed by
other several sectors, including min-
ing and quarrying, construction, trans-
portation and communication, finance,
rent and business services, and other
services. However, in contrast to other
districts, the manufacturing sector is
the largest contributor to Gianyar’s
economy. In 1997, the contribution of
this sector was about 19 percent, in-
creasing to 20 percent by 2001. This
figure is much higher than the Bali
provincial level of 8.5 percent (CBS of
Bali 2001). The total contribution of
the tourism related sectors was great-
est with 29 percent in both 1997 and
2001. The increasing contribution of
the light industry and service sector
was accompanied by the decreasing
contribution of the agricultural sector,
which decreased from 19 percent in
1997 to about 16 percent in 2001. This
figure was lower than the Bali provin-
cial level of 19.1 percent. These fig-
ures demonstrate that the economy of
Gianyar is based on light industry and
service economy, indicating that the
economic transformation from agri-
cultural-based to light industrial and
services-based economy which is oc-
curring at a slower rate in Bali prov-
ince has already happened in Gianyar
district.
Based on all of the figures dis-
cussed above, it can be presumed that
Gianyar’s macro-economy provides a
good opportunity for economic and
business activities. The trend of eco-
nomic growth that accompanied eco-
nomic structural transformation, par-
ticularly in the manufacturing and tour-
ism-related sectors, indicate that these
two sectors hold potential for further
development in the future. Such devel-
opment can be expected to increase the
employment opportunities and in turn
increase the social economic welfare
of people within Gianyar district.
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The Development of LPD of
Gianyar District
The Village Credit Institutions
(Lembaga Perkreditan Desa or LPD)
are community-based financial insti-
tutions (microfinance institutions) that
are owned, managed and used by the
members of the custom village (desa
adat) in Bali (Government of Bali
1988). The first LPD was established
in 1984 and many more followed in the
following years. The objectives of es-
tablishing an LPD in each custom vil-
lage are to support rural economic
development through enhancing sav-
ings behavior of rural people and pro-
viding credit for small-scale enterprise,
to eliminate exploitative forms of credit
relations, to create an equal opportu-
nity for business activities at the vil-
lage level, and to increase the degree
of monetization in rural areas (Gov-
ernment of Bali 2002). These objec-
tives reflect the development mission
of the LPDs to provide financial ser-
vice for rural people in Bali.
Table 4.General indicators of Village Credit Institutions (LPDs) within
Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999-2001
General Indicators 1999 2001
Information on the Village Credit Institutions (LPD):
 Number of LPDs 142 174
 Number of staff 723 873
 Total assets (billion Rp) 58 125
 Total equity (billion Rp) 10.9 25.4
 Total profit (billion Rp) 4.4 10.2
Lending and savings activities:
 Volume of loans outstanding (billion Rp) 36 89
 Number of borrowers 36,454 49,593
 Average loans size per borrower (000 Rp) 954 1,603
 Volume of time deposits (billion Rp) 23 47
 Number of time deposits account (depositors) 6820 7948
 Average deposit per depositor (million Rp) 3.5 5.7
 Volume of savings (billion Rp) 22.5 50
 Number of savings account (savers) 81,178 114,994
 Average savings per saver (000 Rp) 243 415
 Bank deposits in Bank BPD Bali (billion Rp) 20 29
Financial intermediation indicators:
 Deposits to loan ratio (DLR) in % 111 106
 Savers and depositors to borrowers ratio (%) 241 248
Source: Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(PLPDK 1999; PLPDK 2001) (computed by the author).
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In Gianyar district of Bali, the
first Village Credit Institution (LPD)
established was LPD Manukaya, as
one of LPD pilot projects, which is
located in the custom village of
Manukaya in 1984. Subsequently, the
growth of LPD in Gianyar district has
been very fast. On the one hand, the
rapid rise of LPDs is due the increas-
ing demand of Balinese for rural finan-
cial institutions since the institutions
have been able to meet their needs for
an easy access for credit (Arsyad 2005).
On the other hand, the provincial gov-
ernment of Bali and Bank BPD Bali
actively support the establishment of
new LPDs by funds provision as an
initial capital and supervision for the
establishment of the LPDs. The pro-
vincial government of Bali plans to set
up one LPD in each of the 1,600 cus-
tom village.
As seen in Table 4, at the end of
2001, it has been recorded that 174
LPDs have been established in Gianyar
district, and they were spread over all
of the seven subdistricts. These LPDs
together employ 873 employees di-
rectly. In terms of asset development,
the LPDs of Gianyar have also experi-
enced a remarkable growth. Table 4
also shows that in only two years be-
tween 1999 and 2001, total assets in-
creased almost 2.5 times from Rp58
billion to Rp125 billion. This growth
was mainly caused by the growth of
loans outstanding that more than
doubled from Rp36 billion in 1999 to
Rp89 billion in 2001. In addition, es-
tablishment of new LPDs also has in-
creased the total assets.
Meanwhile, its equity also more
than doubled from Rp10.9 billion in
1999 to Rp25.4 billion in 2001. Equity
here refers to value to invested capital
(initial investment) plus retained earn-
ings. The increasing equity resulted
from the increase of retained earnings
(total profit). As shown in Table 4,
total profit of the LPDs has increased
from Rp4.4 billion in 1999 to Rp10.2
billion in 2001. In addition to the profit,
the initial investment for new estab-
lishments of the LPDs also has raised
the total equity.
The main activity of the LPDs is
lending-savings activity for mainly
small-scale entrepreneurs, small trad-
ers, and farmers. The volume of loans
outstanding also rapidly increases from
year to year. The data in Table 4 shows
that in 1999 the volume of loans out-
standing has been Rp36 billion and in
2001 this amount increases to Rp89
billion. Moreover, other than the vol-
ume of loans outstanding, the number
of borrowers also increases from
36,454 borrowers to 49,593 borrowers
in the same period.
The development indicators of
LPDs from deposits side are savings
and time deposits. Both savings and
time deposits are very high, not only in
terms of the value of funds generated,
but also in terms of the number of
savers and depositors. Table 4 shows
that the total amount of funds gener-
ated from the clients through savings
and time deposits exceeded the total
amount of loans outstanding in 1999
and 2001. In 1999 the generated funds
from the clients was Rp45.5 billion
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while the total of loans outstanding
was Rp36 billion. In 2001 these amount
increase to Rp97 billion and Rp89
billion respectively. Table 4 also shows
that the number of savers and deposi-
tors also exceeded the number of bor-
rowers in 1999 and 2001. In 2001, the
number of borrowers of 49,593 was
much lower than the number of savers
and depositors accounts of 122,942.
These high growths of number of bor-
rowers, outstanding loans, savings and
deposits are evidence of strong client
demand.
The figures above will in turn
affect the deposits to loans ratio (DLR)
and savers (and depositors) to borrow-
ers ratio. Table 4 shows that these two
ratios were higher than 100 percent
and the most remarkable thing is that
the savers and depositors to borrowers
ratio exceeded 200 percent in 1999
and 2001. This phenomenon implies
that the LPDs in Gianyar have suc-
ceeded in achieving their role as finan-
cial intermediaries and to enhance their
outreach, which is a proxy of its posi-
tive impact on rural economic devel-
opment.
Portfolio Quality, Leverage,
and Capital Adequacy
Portfolio quality, particularly, the
repayment rate is the most important
performance indicator of microfinance
institution since it has a large bearing
on whether a microfinance institution
is likely to be self-sufficient and sus-
tainable in the long run (Christen 1998;
Sharma and Zeller 1997; Woolcock
1999; Yaron 1994; Zeller 1998). Yaron
(1994) argues that a high profit earned
by microfinance institutions cannot be
used as the only indicator of self-
sustainability of the institutions, since
a high profit could be attained just in
the short period only. Attaining a high
rate of loan collection (repayment rate)
is a necessary condition for a micro-
finance institution to become self-sus-
tainable in the long run. Loan losses
often have been the largest cost borne
by the institutions and the principal
cause of insolvency and illiquidity.
The importance of the portfolio qual-
ity indicator is also reflected in the
healthiness criteria of banking institu-
tion set up by the Central Bank –the so-
called CAMEL criteria– that gives a
high weight of thirty percent for this
indicator (Bank Indonesia 1997 ).
In this study, portfolio quality per-
formance is assessed using two indica-
tors, that is, repayment rate and delin-
quent borrower ratio. According to
Bank BPD Bali (2000), the loans port-
folio of LPD is classified into four
categories: pass, doubtful, substandard,
and loss. In this study the repayment
rate refers to the ratio between the first
three categories of outstanding loans
divided by total outstanding loans (all
four categories) and delinquent bor-
rower ratio refers to the number of
borrowers who do not repay their loans
until past due relative to total borrow-
ers. Based on the data in Table 5, the
LPDs within Gianyar district perform
a good portfolio quality, which is re-
flected by its high repayment rate and
low delinquents borrowers ratio.
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There are four interrelating rea-
sons that could explain the good port-
folio performance. Firstly, in accor-
dance with its regulation, an LPD only
gives loans to the clients who have
their own business, such as small-scale
industry entrepreneurs, farmers, or
small traders. The credit should be
used for productive economic activi-
ties purposes (Government of Bali
2002). For the LPDs management, it is
relatively easy to identify the credit
applicants whether or not they have
business activities since the operational
area of each LPD is limited in a custom
village in which most of the people
know each other. As a result, this could
positively influence their repayment
ability. The use of village agents, such
as custom village leader in Bali, in
screening potential borrowers and col-
lecting repayment would help to miti-
gate the information problems that
hamper the performance of microfi-
nance institutions when lending to
small entrepreneurs (Arsyad 2005;
Chaves and Gonzales-Vega 1996;
Fuentes 1996; Onchan 1992; Timberg
and Aiyar 1984; Yaron 1992). In addi-
tion, by gaining access through the
agent to village-level enforcement
mechanisms such as social sanctions,
the microfinance institution may also
mitigate some of the problem it faces
when collecting repayment.
Secondly, most of the borrowers
are from the custom village where the
LPD is located. The LPDs are rooted
culturally and legally to the custom
village community (Government of
Bali 1988). The LPDs are community
financial institutions which are owned,
managed, and used by the members of
the custom village. This embeddedness
of the LPDs within its local institu-
tions has caused the clients’ sense of
belonging of their LPD and moral ob-
ligation to help the development of
their LPD (Arsyad 2005). Moreover,
in credit mechanism including screen-
ing process and contractual enforce-
ment, the LPDs management cooper-
Table 5. Portfolio Quality, Leverage, and CAR of LPDs within Gianyar
District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001 (means)
Indicators 1999 2001
 Portfolio quality:
Repayment rate (%) 95 97
Delinquent borrowers ratio (%) 0.5 0.4
 Leverage
(Debt to Equity Ratio) in % 220 210
 Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in % 31 61
Source: Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(PLPDK 1999; PLPDK 2001) (computed by the author).
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ates with the Board of Commissioners
(Dewan Pengawas) –led by the custom
village leader (Bendesa Adat)– who
knows the character (reputation) of the
clients well. The use of this informal
institution has been comparatively ef-
ficient in avoiding costly mistakes in
assessing the probability of loan re-
payment.
Thirdly, the custom (social) sanc-
tions –that could be applied in accor-
dance with the written custom village
regulations (awig-awig) – have forced
the borrowers to repay their credits
timely. According to the interviews
and Oka (1999: 17), the custom village
regulation has been effective in over-
coming the problem of delinquent bor-
rowers or low repayment rate. Finally,
the LPDs staff members have a high
mobility in respect to collecting loan
repayments. A LPD staff member vis-
its the clients in their houses (mobile
banking techniques) to collect savings
deposits and loan repayments in per-
son. This system has also forced the
clients to repay their loans regularly
and timely.
In summary, it could be argued
that a good portfolio quality perfor-
mance of LPDs is affected by practical
arrangement of LPD management us-
ing social custom regulation which
includes social norms, sanctions, and
involvement of custom village leader
in screening process and contractual
enforcement of loan (informal institu-
tions), regulations set up by the Cen-
tral Bank (formal institutions), and the
mechanism of collecting loan repay-
ments applied by the LPDs manage-
ment.
Leverage and capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) reflects the structure and
sufficiency of capital of microfinance
institutions. It is argued that sufficient
capital is also one of the key factors
affecting the healthiness and sus-
tainability of microfinance institutions,
since sufficient capital encourages
lenders (if the microfinance institu-
tions borrow funds from, for instance,
commercial banks) and depositors to
have confidence in the microfinance
institutions relative to its ability to
provide for losses and fund future
growth (Ledgerwood 1999).
In this study, the leverage of LPDs
is calculated using debt to equity ratio
(DER). The LPDs of Gianyar has a
relatively high DER of larger than two
hundred percent. This high DER was
mainly caused by the high value of
clients’ savings and deposit since the
LPDs did not borrow any funds from
other institutions. The clients’ savings
and deposit is classified as a debt in
banking or microfinance institutions
(Ledgerwood 1999: 224). However,
as shown in Table 5, the DER of the
LPDs slightly decreased from 220 per-
cent in 1999 to 210 percent in 2001.
The decrease of DER in that period
was mainly caused by the increase of
the equity of the LPDs which was
doubled in 2001 as shown in Table 5.
The increasing trend of equity indi-
cates that the LPDs have been experi-
encing an improved capital structure
that in turn could enhance their the
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ability to be sustainable microfinance
institutions.
Concerning the leverage,
Ledgerwood (1999: 224) argues that
any microfinance institution has to
maintain a proper balance between
debt and equity to ensure that the eq-
uity or viability of the institution is not
at risk. Further, she argues that when a
microfinance institution (such as the
LPDs) has a large amount of equity
and very little debt, it is likely limiting
its income-generating-potential by not
making use of external sources of debt.
In this respect, the LPDs have chosen
a profitable way, by offering a line of
credit or a loan that can be borrowed
for 0.8 percent (for savings) and 1.3
percent (for time deposit) monthly,
and onlent the generated funds (sav-
ings and time deposit) to the clients in
the range of 2.25-2.75 percent monthly.
Therefore, as Ledgerwood (1999)
states, it may be better for a micro-
finance institution to increase its li-
abilities (in particular savings and time
deposits), when it is possible to in-
crease its income-generating assets (its
loan portfolio), and this is the case
with the LPDs.
According to banking regulations
(formal institutions), there is no re-
striction on the leverage (DER) of any
microfinance institution in Indonesia,
including the LPDs. However, there is
a regulation from the Central Bank
(Bank Indonesia 1997) that any
microfinance institutions has to main-
tain the loan to deposit ratio (LDR)
around 95 percent and the minimum
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10
percent to ensure the security of the
clients’ savings (including their de-
posits) and the viability of the institu-
tion.
Based on the capital adequacy
ratio (CAR),10 the LPDs of Gianyar
also show a good performance. Table
5 shows that LPDs have a high CAR
which remarkably increased from 31
percent in 1999 to 61 percent in 2001.
This figure is very much higher than
the minimum CAR of 10 percent for a
healthy microfinance institution set up
by the Central Bank (Bank Indonesia
1997). Like the decreasing trend in
DER, the increasing trend in the CAR
of LPDs is mainly caused by the rapid
growth in the equity. The increasing
trend of CAR resulting from the rapid
growth of equity supports the previous
findings that the potentiality of LPDs
to be a self-sustained microfinance
institution is high.
Productivity and Efficiency
Productivity refers to the volume
of business that is generated (output)
for a given resource or asset (input),
while efficiency refers to the cost per
unit of output. Based on those two
indicators the LPDs within Gianyar
district also show a good performance.
Its productivity indicators, which are
measured by several indicators (see
10 CAR refers to the level of capital required to absorb potential losses while providing financial
sustainability. The calculation method of CAR is presented in Appendix 1.
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Table 6), reveal an increasing trend
between 1999 and 2001, which means
the productivity of its staff increased
during this period. Productivity per
staff member, which is reflected by the
workload of the average staff member,
increased from 108 to 125 savers per
staff in 1999 and 2001 respectively.
On the other hand, this increase could
augment the burden of the staff par-
ticularly in monitoring the clients and
enforcing the contractual agreement
with the clients to keep a good repay-
ment rate.
The size of savings and time de-
posits per staff member has also in-
creased from Rp31 million in 1999 to
over Rp50 million in 2001. Mean-
while, the average loans outstanding
managed per staff member has almost
doubled from Rp48 million in 1999 to
Rp93 million in 2001. In some studies
the productivity indicators were some-
times treated as outreach indicators
(Yaron 1992; Yaron 1994; Yaron et al.
1998). Hence, these figures imply that
the outreach of the LPDs of Gianyar
district has increased in that period.
One internal factor that might con-
tribute to this increasing productivity
of the LPDs staff is the remuneration
system. Three chairmen of LPDs in-
terviewed point out that all manage-
ment staff is satisfied with the remu-
neration system which is indicated by
the working motivation of the staffs.
According to the three chairmen, the
working motivation of the staffs is
high. The interviews with the chair-
men (interviews 7 and 8 February 2002;
21, 23, 25, 26 February 2003) revealed
that the LPD staff are favorably dis-
Table 6. Productivity and Efficiency of LPDs within Gianyar District of Bali
Province 1999 and 2001 (means)
Indicators 1999 2001
Productivity:
 Number of borrowers per staff 49 67
 Loans outstanding per staff (million Rp) 48 67
 Number of savers per staff 108 111
 Savings per staff (million Rp) 31 34
 Number of depositors per staff 9 8
 Time deposits per staff (million Rp) 31 35
Efficiency:
 Operating cost ratio 0.20 0.22
 Salaries as a percentage of average
portfolio outstanding 0.006 0.008
Source: Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(PLPDK 2001;  PLPDK 1999) (computed by the author).
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posed to the current remuneration sys-
tem of basic salary and incentives
which they regard as competitive and
fair. However, an external factor must
also be considered, namely the increase
in clients of the LPDs –including bor-
rowers, savers, and depositors– that
have forced the staff to serve more
clients that in turn increase the produc-
tivity and workload of the staff mem-
ber.
The LPDs’ efficiency is measured
by two indicators, which are operating
cost ratio that refers to operating costs
relative to the average portfolio out-
standing and salaries as a percentage
of average portfolios outstanding.
Based on those two indicators as shown
in Table 6, it could be concluded that
LPDs are efficient. The data in the
Table shows that their operating cost
ratio was 20 percent and 22 percent in
1999 and 2001 respectively. This
means that the LPDs fully covered the
cost day-to-day operations, including
salaries and administrative costs, with
revenues from interest. The revenues
of LPDs are gained almost exclusively
from lending, with loanable funds de-
rived from savings and time deposits,
since most of them do not have any
business activity other than lending
and saving activities. Based on a study
of USAID in several developing coun-
tries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Senegal, Dominica, Costa Rica, Co-
lombia, and Niger), successful
microfinance institutions tend to have
operating cost ratios of between 13
and 21 percent of their average loan
portfolios (Christen et al. 1995). Com-
pared to the other developing coun-
tries, the operating cost ratio of LPDs
is close to upper end of the range,
meaning that the LPDs are still effi-
cient.
Meanwhile the salaries ratio of
LPD is extremely low around 0.7 per-
cent. Christen et al. (1995) state that
the ratio of many successful micro-
finance institutions lies between 4 to
16 percent of average portfolio out-
standing. This low salary cost is partly
because the LPDs use local commu-
nity personnel as their staff in manag-
ing the LPD and the local cost of living
as determining factor for the basic
salary. Furthermore, the local govern-
ment (formal institutions) regulates the
remuneration system of the LPD’s
staff, which is a function of financial
capacity (profits and loan instalment
recovered) of the LPD, and thus is
observable and measurable.
This high efficiency of LPDs could
be attributed to two main factors.
Firstly, low transaction costs. The
LPDs have applied a flexible arrange-
ment in delivery mechanism. As local
and user-owned financial institutions
whose operational coverage of a small
area of custom village allow the LPDs
management to have an intimate knowl-
edge of their clients and harness mecha-
nisms of social control in screening
and contractual enforcement process.
This mechanism has reduced and mini-
mized the transaction costs for both
lender and borrower. Secondly, low
salary cost. The remuneration system
which is based on the local cost of
living and financial capacity (profits
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and loan instalment recovered) of the
LPDs has also contributed to the high
efficiency of the LPDs.
Profitability and Financial
Viability
Ledgerwood (1999) points out that
profitability and efficiency are key fac-
tors shaping the financial viability (op-
erational and financial self-sufficiency)
of a microfinance institution. Previous
section has revealed that the LPDs in
Gianyar district are efficient. This sec-
tion deals with the profitability and
financial viability which would influ-
ence the sustainability of microfinance
institution.
By using the consolidated finan-
cial reports of LPDs of Gianyar dis-
trict, it is found that the LPDs have
been profitable. The evidence that
LPDs are fully profitable lies in the
positive adjusted returns on assets
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE).
Table 7 shows that the adjusted ROA
increased from 10 percent in 1999 to
13.5 percent in 2001. The indicators
are high enough to gain profit and
show a rising trend from 1999 to 2001.
Compared to the adjusted ROA of
LPDs at provincial level of 7.4 percent
(Christen et al. 1995), this figure is
higher.
The adjusted ROE experienced a
high growth from 23 percent in 1999 to
51 percent in 2001. These figures are
much higher than the inflation rate of
10.3 and 11.4 percent per annum in the
same period. They are also much higher
than the time deposit interest rate of
commercial banks which was around
14-16 percent in that period. When we
consider the time deposit interest rates
of commercial banks as the opportu-
nity of the LPDs, this number implies
that the LPDs have been sustainable
according to the definition of micro-
finance sustainability (Yaron 1994).
However, in a comparative con-
text, this figure is slightly lower than
the ROE of the LPDs at the provincial
Table 7. Profitability and Financial Viability of LPDs within Gianyar Dis-
trict of Bali Province 1999 and 2001 (means)
Indicators 1999 2001
Profitability:
 Adjusted Return on Asset (ROA) in % 10 13.5
 Adjusted Return on Equity (ROE) in % 23 52
Financial viability:
 Operational self-sufficiency (%) 199 196
 Financial self-sufficiency (%) 181 163
Source: Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(PLPDK 1999; PLPDK 2001) (computed by the author).
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level of 54.2 percent calculated by
Chaves and Gonzales-Vega (1995),
but it is still higher than the calculation
of Christen et al (1995) of 32.7 percent
per annum. This difference might be
caused by different method of calcula-
tion and period. Compared to the ROE
of BKK of 13 percent (Yaron 1992)
which have similar characteristics with
the LPDs, the figure is much higher.
In sum, the growth of those two
profitability indicators (ROA and
ROE) indicates that the LPDs have
been able to perform as a profitable
and sustainable microfinance institu-
tion. Three internal factors might con-
tribute to this high profitability rate.
First, the high level of efficiency of the
LPDs, as discussed earlier, obviously
contributed to this high profitability.
Second, the high growth of clients
deposits (savings and time deposit),
accompanied by the high growth of
loans disbursed, also plays a role in the
profitability of the LPDs. Even though
the high growth of clients’ deposits of
the LPDs has resulted in high DER, the
LPDs were able to on-lend the depos-
its to its clients and generate income.
In addition, when the LPDs experi-
ence excess liquidity they have to de-
posit their excess liquidity to Bank
BPD Bali and receive a competitive
interest rate (Government of Bali
1988). Third, the high repayment rate
of the LPDs greatly contributed to the
high profitability. This high repayment
rate maintains the liquidity of the LPDs
and then sustains the ability of LPDs to
on-lend the generated funds to its cli-
ents. Finally, the external factor that
has supported the LPDs to gain their
high profitability is macroeconomic
environment. A stable and growing
macroeconomic condition of Gianyar
district has enabled the LPDs to attain
the high profitability rate. According
to Statistics of Bali Province 2001,
during Indonesian economic crisis
from 1997 until 1999, the Gianyar
economy still experienced a positive
economic growth. Gianyar economic
growth rates were 6 and 4.5 percent
per annum in 1997 and 2001 respec-
tively. Its economic growth rate in
2001 was higher than Bali and national
average growth rate of 3.4 and 3.3
percent per annum respectively.
Financial viability refers to the
ability of LPD to cover its costs with
earned revenue. Two indicators of fi-
nancial viability used are operational
self-sufficiency and financial self-suf-
ficiency (Ledgerwood 1999). Opera-
tional self-sufficiency indicates the
ability of LPD to earn enough revenue
to cover its direct costs, excluding the
(adjusted) cost of capital but including
actual financing costs incurred. Finan-
cial self-sufficiency indicates the abil-
ity of LPD to earn enough revenue to
cover both direct costs, including fi-
nancing costs, provision for loan losses,
an operating expenses, and indirect
costs, including the adjusted cost of
capital. In this study, the adjusted cost
of capital is considered the cost of
maintaining the value of equity rela-
tive to inflation. The indicators of fi-
nancial viability are also presented in
Table 5.
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The level of financial viability of
the LPDs shows an increasing trend. In
1999 and 2001, the level of opera-
tional self-sufficiency was 199 per-
cent and 196 percent respectively,
whereas the level of financial self-
sufficiency was 181 percent and 163
percent in the same period. These lev-
els of self-sufficiency are higher than
the calculation of Christen et al. (1995),
which were 148 percent and 137 per-
cent for operational and financial self-
sufficiency respectively. Combined
with other financial indicators dis-
cussed above, the increasing trend of
operational and financial self-suffi-
ciency evidently indicates that the
LPDs have been financially viable,
which is one of the necessary condi-
tions for a sustainable microfinance
institution.
There are three internal interre-
lated factors explaining this high fi-
nancial viability which are high profit-
ability, high efficiency, and good port-
folio quality or high repayment rate.
As discussed above, the high level of
efficiency of the LPDs has resulted in
the high profitability. In literature, it is
argued that the efficiency and profit-
ability are the main factors shaping
self-sufficiency of microfinance insti-
tution (Ledgerwood 1999: 217). More
specifically, Christen et al (1995) ar-
gue that the levels of self-sufficiency
have been very much affected by the
effective real interest rate charged by a
microfinance institution which, in turn,
affects the profitability of the institu-
tion. The LPDs charge an interest rate
of around 0.8-1.3 percent monthly for
savings (and time deposits) and 2.25-
2.75 percent monthly for lending rate.
These figures show that the LPDs have
set up an effective real rate of interest
high enough to cover their costs, in-
cluding the cost of capital fully ad-
justed for inflation. Lastly, good port-
folio quality or high repayment rate
has contributed to the self-sufficiency
of LPDs both directly through its ef-
fect on the profitability and indirectly
through its effect on the liquidity and
net income of LPDs. As noted earlier,
attaining a high repayment rate is a
necessary condition for a microfinance
institution to become self-sustainable
in the long run.
Outreach
As noted earlier, some scholars
(Schreiner 2001; Yaron 1994; Yaron
et al. 1997) point out that outreach
indicators could be used as indicators
of the impact of microfinance institu-
tions on economic development. They
argue that even though the indicators
do not provide a full assessment of a
microfinance institution impact on eco-
nomic development, they serve as
quantifiable proxies of the extent to
which a microfinance institution has
reached its objectives of providing so-
cial benefits for poor people. Hence,
the outreach indicators have to be con-
sidered in the context of the objectives
of microfinance institution, which de-
fine its target clientele. These indica-
tors are classified into three groups:
client and staff, loan, and savings/de-
posit outreach (Table 8).
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Table 8. Outreach of LPDs within Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and
2001
Indicators 1999 2001
Clients and Staff outreach:
 Number of borrowers 36,454 49,593
 Average borrowers per LPD 309 324
 Number of savers 81,178 114,994
 Average savers per LPD 695 751
 Number of deposit accounts (depositors) 6820 7948
 Average depositor per LPD 60 52
 Number of staff 723 835
 Average number of staff per LPD n.a. 5
 Percentage of total target
clientele serviced (%) 10.3 13.4
Loan outreach:
 Volume of outstanding loans (billion Rp) 36 89
 Average outstanding loan per LPD (million Rp) 308 587
 Average loans per borrower (million Rp) 0.9 1.6
 Average loans per borrower as
percentage of GRDP per capita* 0.21 0.27
Saving/Deposits outreach:
 Volume of savings (billion Rp) 22.5 50
 Average savings per LPD (million Rp) 198 327
 Average savings per saver as proportion
of GRDP/capita* 0.05 0.07
 Volume of time deposits (billion Rp) 22 46
 Average deposits per LPD ((million Rp) 221 335
 Average deposit per depositor
as proportion of GRDP/capita* 0.7 0.9
Note: *) GRDP per capita of Gianyar district at current price in 1999 and 2001 were Rp 4.6
million and Rp 5.8 million respectively.
n.a.= not available
Source: Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(PLPDK 1999; PLPDK 2001) (computed by the author).
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As shown in Table 8, the LPDs
experienced an increasing trend for
almost all outreach indicators, except
average depositor per LPD. The scale
of outreach, for instance, measured by
the number of clients served and the
volume of outstanding loans and sav-
ings, have grown significantly in the
period of 1999 to 2001. In 1999, the
total number of borrower was 36,454
while the total number of savers and
depositors was 87,998 and these fig-
ures increased to 49,593 and 122,942
respectively in 2001. Along with the
client growth, the volume of outstand-
ing loans has also increased almost 1.5
times from Rp36 billion in 1999 to
Rp89 billion in 2001. Meanwhile, the
volume of savings and time deposits
has increased more than 100 percent
from Rp44.5 billion in 1999 to Rp96
billion in 2001.
The figures in the Table 8 show
that, firstly, the total clientele served
in terms of savers and depositors was
higher than the total clientele served in
terms of borrowers and, secondly, the
volume of loan outstanding is lower
than the volume of total savings and
time deposit. There are two important
things worth noting from these fig-
ures. First, the figures indicate that the
LPDs have succeeded to stimulate and
enhance the savings behavior of rural
people. In addition, this situation shows
that the LPDs have achieved one of
their objectives, which is to increase
particularly banking mindedness of
rural people and the degree of moneti-
zation in rural areas in general (Gov-
ernment of Bali 2002). Second, the
figures also indicate that the LPDs
have succeeded to offer an appropriate
mechanism in mobilizing savings such
as mobile banking system, interest
rates, and other incentives for savers
and potential savers.
The clients of LPDs (interviews
on 22 and 23 February 2002) point out
that the LPDs delivery mechanisms
have met their needs. Moreover, it can
be argued that this situation also im-
plies that the clients’ confidence on
the LPDs has been high, since the
savings security is an important con-
sideration for the clients in making a
decision to save or not to save in any
financial institution (Arsyad 2005).
This finding also confirms to the find-
ings of other studies (Adams 1978;
Kelley and Williamson 1968;
Robinson 1994) which reveal that ru-
ral people –including household, small-
scale enterprises, organizations– will
save in a financial form if appropriate
institutions are offering security, con-
venience, liquidity, and returns on sav-
ings. The ability of microfinance insti-
tutions –the LPDs in this case– to meet
the needs of the local people that they
are designed to help will, in turn, be
one of the advantages of the LPDs to
be a sustainable microfinance institu-
tion (Snow 1999, p. 66). From an insti-
tutional point of view, incorporating
savings mobilization in microfinance
institutions will have at least three
benefits for the institutions (Robinson
1995). First, it can provide a relatively
inexpensive source of capital for re-
lending. Second, today’s depositors
may be tomorrow’s borrowers, so the
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savings program creates a natural cli-
ent pool. Third, building up savings
may offer important advantages to low-
income households directly: house-
holds can build up assets to use as
collateral, they can build up a reserve
to reduce consumption volatility over
time, and they may be able to self-
finance investments rather than always
turning to creditors.
The depth of outreach is shown by
target clientele (borrowers) serviced,
average loan/savings/time deposits per
borrower, and the ratio of the average
loans per borrower, average savings
per saver, and average time deposits
per depositor to GRDP per capita. The
depth of outreach indicators reflect the
value that society attaches to the net
gain of a given client (Schreiner 2002:
594).
The data in the table reveals that
target clientele served has increased
from 10.3 percent in 1999 to 13.4
percent in 2001. Along with the in-
crease in the target client served, the
average loan per LPD has also in-
creased from Rp308 million in 1999 to
Rp587 million in 2001 and the average
savings and time deposits per LPD
increased from Rp198 million and
Rp221 million in 1999 to Rp327 mil-
lion and Rp335 million in 2001. These
figures reflect that the LPDs have also
reached one of its objectives, that is, to
support rural economic development
through providing credit to local
people.
The ratio of the average loans per
borrower, average savings per saver,
and average time deposits per deposi-
tor to GRDP per capita have also in-
creased along with the increase of their
percentages of GRDP per capita. These
figures indicate that both the economic
capacity and banking mindedness of
the clients and financial capability of
LPDs in providing financial services
have also increased in line with the
growth of GRDP per capita (economic
growth) in Gianyar district of Bali. In
other words, the figures also indicate
that the LPDs have yielded social ben-
efits for their clients.
Referring to the objectives of
LPDs (Government of Bali 2002), all
of these figures indicate that the LPDs
have been able to achieve their objec-
tives, which are to support rural eco-
nomic development through enhanc-
ing savings behavior of rural people
and providing credit for local people,
to create an equal and opportunity for
business activities in the village level,
and to increase the degree of moneti-
zation in rural areas. Hence, it can be
argued that the LPDs have had some
positive impacts on rural economic
development in Gianyar district of Bali.
In sum, the growth of the outreach
indicators of LPDs indicates that the
LPDs have yielded social benefits for
their clients and, hence, played an im-
portant role in rural economic devel-
opment in Gianyar district of Bali.
There are four factors shaping the
growth described above. Firstly, the
ability of LPDs management to offer
an appropriate delivery mechanism that
meet and suit to the needs of the local
people. Secondly, an increasing num-
ber of staff and its productivity, as
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discussed earlier, also contribute to
this growth. Thirdly, the social ties of
LPDs to their clients in a custom vil-
lage that shared social and religious
norms has encouraged high clients’
reliance and loyalty (sense of belong-
ing) on the LPDs and, in turn, influ-
enced the outreach of LPDs (Arsyad
2005). Finally, the growing macroeco-
nomic condition of Gianyar district
has also contributed to the growth of
outreach of the LPDs. It is argued that
a growing economy has resulted in
high and growing demands for finan-
cial services offered by financial insti-
tutions (Chaves and Gonzales-Vega
1996; Franks 2000; Robinson 2001),
such as LPDs, that in turn affect their
outreach as well.
Conclusion
First, based on the analysis above
it can be concluded that the LPDs in
Gianyar district have a good perfor-
mance and could be considered as suc-
cess microfinance institutions. The per-
formance indicators assessed include
portfolio quality, leverage, capital ad-
equacy ratio (CAR), productivity, ef-
ficiency, profitability, self-sufficiency,
and outreach. Based on the necessary
conditions of sustainable microfinance
institution proposed by some scholars
(Christen 1998, Yaron 1994), it can be
concluded that the LPDs of Gianyar
district have been sustainable. This
also implies that the LPDs have posi-
tive net social benefits for their clients.
As argued by some scholars (Ostrom
et al. 1993: 13-14), when a micro-
finance institution becomes sustain-
able, net social benefits will be posi-
tive. Hence, the positive impact of the
LPDs on their target clientele indi-
cates that the role of LPDs as a devel-
opment tool has been evident in eco-
nomic development of Gianyar dis-
trict.
Second, the good performance and
sustainability of the LPDs has been
influenced by both formal and infor-
mal institutions, and a growing
economy of Gianyar district. The in-
fluence of formal institutions that is
reflected by supporting government
policy at all levels through provision
of a legal basis for the LPDs and the
Central Bank regulation (formal insti-
tutions) as also pointed by Arsyad
(2005) have contributed to the success
of the LPDs in Gianyar district.
The influence of informal institu-
tions is indicated in several aspects.
Firstly, the use of local people in man-
aging LPD and the application charac-
ter-based lending system in credit de-
livery system. As mentioned earlier,
the LPDs are community financial in-
stitutions which are owned, managed,
and used by the members of a custom
village. This has resulted in a high
clients’ sense of belonging and moral
obligation to support the development
of LPD. Secondly, the use of social
(custom) sanctions in contractual en-
forcement has forced the borrowers to
comply with their credit contract in a
timely fashion. Thirdly, the use of mo-
bile banking technique for collecting
savings deposits and loan repayments
directly has also compelled the clients
421
Arsyad—An Assessment of Microfinance Institution Performance
to repay their loans regularly and
timely. Fourthly, the use of local com-
munity personnel in its operations
whose remuneration is based on per-
formance and low transaction costs
has resulted in a high efficiency of
LPDs. This high efficiency in turn has
fostered a high profitability and self-
sufficiency of LPDs. Lastly, the high
outreach level of LPDs accompanied
by a high clients’ loyalty has a positive
impact on the sustainability of the
LPDs. As argued by Christen (1998),
one of the most important factors af-
fecting the self-sustainability of
microfinance institutions is a high out-
reach level. Last but not least, a stable
and growing economy of Gianyar dis-
trict has also offered an auspicious
climate for the LPDs to develop and to
have a good performance.
In sum, the findings of this study
reveal the important role of the socio-
economic environment (particularly in-
stitutional environment) on the
sustainability of microfinance institu-
tions. Practically, however, any attempt
to replicate the achievements of the
LPDs by imitating their mode of op-
erations should be conducted with great
caution. A mechanism that works well
in one socioeconomic environment (in
this instance, in Bali) will not neces-
sarily work in another, where the so-
cial system such as custom, social
norms, and values are different. How-
ever, the experience of the LPDs has
highlighted some critical issues that
should be considered when handling
the complex issue in providing finan-
cial services to the rural people.
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Appendix 1. Calculation Method of Financial Performance Indicators
1. Portfolio Quality
LPPDS
RR = —————
PO
DBR
DBR = ————
TNAB
2. Productivity and Efficiency Ratios
The productivity ratios used in this study include number of active borrowers per staff,
portfolio outstanding per staff, total amount disbursed in the period per staff, number
of active depositors per staff, deposits outstanding per staff, and total amount of
savings collected in the period per staff.
Efficiency indicators used in this study are operating cost ratio and salaries as
percentage of average portfolio outstanding.
OC
OCR = ————
APO
SAB
SAPAPO = ————
APO
3. Financial Viability
To determine financial viability, two self-sufficiency indicators are calculated, which
are operational self-sufficiency and financial self-sufficiency.
OI
OSS = —————
OE + PLL
OI
FSS = ----------------------------
OE + FC + PLL + COC
RR : Repayment rate
LPPDS: Loan portfolio (pass + doubtful + sub-standard)
PO : Portfolio outstanding (including amounts past
due)
DBR : Delinquent borrowers ratio
NDB : Number of delinquent borrowers
TNAB : Total number of active borrowers
OCR : Operating cost ratio
OC : Operating costs
APO : Average portfolio outstanding
SAPAPO : Salaries as a percentage of average portfolio
outstanding
SAB : Salaries and benefits
APO : Average portfolio outstanding
OSS : Operational self-sufficiency
OI : Operating income
OE : Operating expenses
PLL : Provision for loan losses
FSS : Financial self-sufficiency
OI : Operating income
OE : Operating expenses
FC : Financing costs
PLL : Provision for loan losses
COC : Cost of capital
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4. Profitability Ratios
Two profitability ratio used in this study include return on asset (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE).
NI
ROA = ————
AA
NAI
ROE (adjusted) = ————
AE
5. Leverage and Capital Adequacy
A microfinance institution’s leverage is measured by calculating its debt to equity ratio.
The debt to equity ratio states how much debt a microfinance institution has relative
to its equity. In this study, debt of LPD consists of savings and time deposits of its
clients, since LPD does not borrow any fund from other institutions.
 D
DER = —————
 E
Capital adequacy refers to the amount of capital an MFI has relative to its assets. Capital
adequacy relates to leverage in terms of the adequacy of the microfinance institution’s
funding structure. Capital adequacy means that there is a sufficient level of capital
required to absorb potential losses while providing financial sustainability.
Capital adequacy is usually measured by the following ratio of capital to risk-weighted
assets:
IC + R + RE
CRWA = ———————
 RWA
The calculation of Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is based on the ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets. For microfinance institutions in Indonesia, as well as the LPDs, as set out
by Bank Indonesia (The Central Bank) the capital consists of invested capital (initial
capital), provision for loan losses, retained earnings and current profits. Meanwhile, the
risk-weighted assets are classified into five categories whose the standard risk weights
ranging from 0 percent to 100 percent risk. The first category is cash with 0 percent risk-
weighted, the second is deposits in Bank BPD of Bali with 20 percent risk-weighted, the
third is outstanding loans with 100 percent risk-weighted, the fourth is fixed assets with 100
percent risk-weighted, and the last is other assets with 100 percent risk-weighted.
ROA: Return on assets
NI : Net income
AA : Average assets
ROE adjusted : Adjusted Return of equity
NAI : Net adjusted income
AE : Average equity
DER : Debt to equity ratio
D : Debt
E : Equity
CRWA : Capital to risk-weighted assets
IC : Invested capital
R : Reserves
RE : Retained earnings
RWA : Risk-weighted assets
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Appendix 2. List of Interviewees*
No. Name Position Date of Interview
1 Bagus Sara Provincial Government Officer 6 February 2002
2 Gusti Arya Provincial Government Officer 6 February 2002
20 February 2003
3 Bagus Sana Bank BPD Bali Officer 7 February 2002
21 February 2003
4 Wayan Weka Bank BPD Bali Officer 7 February 2002
21 February 2003
5 Nyoman Awan Chairman of LPD Talepud 7 & 8 February 2002
6 Made Dana Chairman of LPD Mas 21-23 February 2003
7 Ketut Awan Chairman of LPD Kerta 25 & 26 February 2003
8 Wayan Jana Member of Commissioner 23 February 2003
Board of LPD Mas
9 Gde Dana Chief of Commissioner Board 25 & 26 February 2003
of LPD Kerta
10 Ktut Empu LPD client 22 February 2002
11 Wayan Elin LPD client 23 February 2002
12 Wayan Arsha LPD client 22 February 2002
*Name of interviewees are disguised
